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TELEVISING THE COURT:
A CATEGORY MISTAKE
Christina B. Whitman* †
The idea of televising Supreme Court oral arguments is undeniably appealing. Consequently, it is not surprising that reporters and politicians have
been pressuring the Court to take this step. The other branches have been
media-friendly for years, and Supreme Court arguments are already open to
the public. Why should those of us who neither reside in Washington, D.C.
nor have the time to attend Court proceedings be asked to depend on reporters for descriptions of the event? Even lower courts permit cameras. There is
an understandable hunger for anything that will help us understand these
nine individuals who have so much power—who can even choose a President, or at least hasten his anointment. Are the Justices refusing to reveal
themselves because they prefer mystery, because they do not want the public
to realize that the Court is a human institution after all? Whatever the Justices’ motives, televising the Court’s arguments is a terrible idea. It is both
misleading and unnecessary. Misleading because it would only randomly
tell us something useful about the Court, and unnecessary because the Court
is already more open than the other branches.
Oral arguments and announcements of decisions are the only moments
of public performance in the work of the Court, but they are more performance than work. Arguments come in the middle of the Justices’
consideration of a case—after considerable reading, discussion, and
thought, but before more of the same. Individual Justices use arguments differently. Some Justices simply do not work out their thoughts orally. The
Justice with whom I am most familiar, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., preferred
to communicate through memoranda—even with his clerks. He was an extremely successful litigator, but also a Southern gentleman. Showing off his
intelligence, much less asking a snide question or making a cutting remark,
was just not his style. Conversely, other Justices enjoy the give-and-take
with each other and with the advocates for the sake of the encounter alone.
Their dialogue may or may not focus on what really matters to their decision in a case. They might just be pouncing on a weak argument for the pure
pleasure of the kill. Either way, every comment is already overanalyzed for
a hint as to what is on the Justices’ minds.

* Francis A. Allen Collegiate Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School; former
Law Clerk to Judge Harold Leventhal of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit and to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. of the Supreme Court of the United States.
† Suggested citation: Christina B. Whitman, Televising the Supreme Court: A Category
Mistake, 106 Mich. L. Rev. First Impressions 5 (2007), http://www.michiganlawreview.org/
firstimpressions/vol106/whitman.pdf.
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Oral arguments already receive too much of the wrong kind of attention
because Court watchers enjoy the game of predicting outcomes, and arguments provide an occasion to justify a story or a comment on a blog. But
this attention gives arguments a misleading importance. It is common to say
that a lawyer cannot win a case by her oral argument, but that she can lose
her case that way. This is as it should be. Ideally, we want effective advocates for both sides, but we should hope that the Justices can rise above a
poor argument and reach a result that reflects judgment and justice despite
the shortcomings of its advocate. Most arguments are lost not by embarrassing advocacy, but rather because a lawyer is not always able to avoid
admitting under direct questioning to a weakness in his case that was concealed in his brief.
I enjoy reading the argument transcripts, which are now available almost
immediately, and I use them in my classes. But they are a treat rather than a
meal. On television and radio, the availability of transcripts already promotes
emphasis on the kinds of insights and ripostes that can be conveyed in soundbites. There are Justices whose performances lend themselves to soundbites,
who have a quick and provocative wit, and these Justices inevitably attract the
most attention. Although these qualities are not inconsistent with greatness,
they are not the qualities that make a Justice great. Despite the fun, focusing
on these qualities distracts us from less flashy indications of excellence.
So, the televising of oral arguments is misleading. It is also unnecessary.
The Court has always been an open institution on the matters that count.
The judiciary, at least at the appellate level, has always been required to expose the reasons underlying its actions more than either of the other
branches of government—through the discipline of writing published opinions. That is the process through which judges are publicly accountable, and
it has no counterpart in the political branches. It is not easy to spot dishonest
reasoning or evaluate quality of judgment as captured in opinions, but it is
possible. It requires effort, and it is admittedly undemocratic in that it also
requires expertise. But it is exactly the process of struggling with writing
that gives the judiciary its unique character and disciplines the tendency to
rely on first impressions or subjective reactions. The voices of individual
Justices can be traced through their separate opinions and even found in
their collegial opinions for a group. But the individual is not obscured just to
create an insiders’ guessing game. The collegial process is the whole point.
A Justice who speaks for the greatest number of her colleagues speaks with
the most authority.
Is it naive to take the collegial character of the Court and its written
opinions so seriously? Perhaps Justices delegate all this effort to their law
clerks and are not really subject to the discipline of forming the written
work. Perhaps they are only really engaged while on the bench, if there. To
the extent that has happened, it is a betrayal of their obligation as Justices, a
rejection of the key justification for judicial review—and certainly not
something to be accepted or encouraged by overemphasizing oral argument.
The standard arguments against televising the Court are true, too. Media
attention might already be encouraging individual Justices to play to an
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audience. It would be unfortunate and inappropriate if the most attractive, or
even the fastest wit, were to become the public face of the Court.
Politicians are accustomed to performing in the spotlight. They may not
appreciate how invasive the camera can seem to people who have not lived
their lives this way. Justice Powell took media access seriously, but he saw it
as a duty rather than a pleasure. Even more exposure to public scrutiny
might have made his years on the Court deeply uncomfortable. For people
like Powell, for whom public service is an obligation and public performance a necessary evil, becoming a media celebrity might be too costly. Yet
we need people like Justice Powell in part because they understand the costs
of public scrutiny and the value of privacy.
A narrow view of accountability, one that reduces it to public observation, has already turned too much governmental decision-making away from
substance. Media attention already focuses on the sharpest tongue on the
bench. Let us not give verbal skill more importance than it deserves, lest it
change the character of our least democratic but most open branch.

